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The Chronology of the Wars in Armenia, A. D. 51-63

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Elmer would have us), whether expressed by *ne* with the perfect subjunctive, by *cave* with the perfect subjunctive, *ne* with the present subjunctive' (Bennett), or *cave* or *vide* with the present subjunctive. I have shown elsewhere (*A. J. P.* xxi. 154–169) that Elmer's theory is untenable for Silver Latin. If untenable for these two periods, it is certainly untenable for all and should be withdrawn.

Four instances cited by Elmer as subjunctives of obligation or propriety should be added for the sake of completeness. They are *And.* 392, *Nec minueris*; *H. T.* 976, *Nec pararis*; *Hec.* 79, *Nullus dixeris*; *And.* 787, *Non credas.* Two additional instances (*Eun.* 1080, *Neque metuas*; *And.* 640, *Nil promoveris*) I cannot find in Elmer's papers on the prohibitive or *Cornell Studies* vi. I regard all six as genuine prohibitions.

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Oct. 12, 1900.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WARS IN ARMENIA, A.D. 51—63.

To be of value, any account of the wars in Armenia under Claudius and Nero between A.D. 51–63 must necessarily furnish and be based upon precise details alike of chronology and of geography. Failing either, the course of events and the strategy of the combatants are vague and unintelligible, and the historical merit therefore of the account is exceedingly small.

But alike the chronology and the geography of the wars in Armenia have been matters of great controversy and widely different conclusions. Here it is my intention to confine myself to a consideration of the former, viz., the chronological difficulties involved, and to present certain conclusions. For a study of the whole chronological question *de novo* compels me to think that we cannot with satisfaction follow any one modern writer throughout, whether he be editor of Tacitus or professed historian.

Some of these modern writers are of no independent value in this connection whatever. Schiller for instance in his very long 'Geschichte des römischen Kaiserreiches unter der Regierung des Nero' (Berlin, 1872) as in his later Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit, adopts almost without discussion the chronological scheme furnished him by Emil Egli, and, if he is conscious on one solitary occasion of the possibility of another view, manages to misunderstand this before rejecting it. For our purpose of fresh inquiry, his History of Nero is a negligeable quantity. Neither do Rawlinson or Merivale contribute anything of value to this subject. Those who have given independent consideration to the chronological problems of the Armenian wars seem to be two editors of Tacitus, Nipperdey and Furneaux, and two others, Emil Egli and Mommsen. These, where failing to agree, resolve into at most three systems of chronology for the years A.D. 51–63, for Furneaux follows Nipperdey so closely as to be practically identical with him, save in one or two minor points. Egli in his 'Feldzüge in Armenien von 41–63' (ap. Büdinger: Untersuchungen zur römischen Kaisergeschichte, Band I, pp. 265–364. Leipzig. 1868) discusses the whole chronological problem at length, without however gaining the adhesion throughout of Mommsen, who in footnotes to the fifth volume of his Roman history (*i.e.* in English Translation *The Provinces*, Vol. II.) and elsewhere suggests an arrangement of his own for some of these years.

It is then because after a fresh investigation of the whole question I find myself compelled to reject now Egli, now Mommsen, now the Nipperdey-Furneaux combination, and at times all three, that I propose here to deal succinctly with the whole controversy in periods, bringing out clearly, so far as I may, the decisive points in the disputes, balancing difficulty and argument against argument and difficulty, and presenting finally that chronological arrangement for the years 51–63 which the balance of evidence seems to me to justify.

The subject may conveniently be divided into three periods, dealing with:—

I. A.D. 51–54 = Tac. Ann. xii. 44–51. xiii. 5. 6.
II. A.D. 54–60 = Tac. Ann. xiii. 7–9. 34–42. xiv. 23–26.
III. A.D. 61–63 = Tac. Ann. xv. 1–17. 24–31.

Throughout in dealing with each it will be my method first (A) to give in order the successive events narrated by Tacitus: secondly (B) to explain and contrast the different chronological systems deduced from Tacitus: thirdly (C) to discuss the respective difficulties of each: and lastly (D) to present that scheme, whether my own or one already suggested, which seems to me on all the evidence the best. Merely negative conclusions are in this matter for me insufficient.

I.—A.D. 51–54.

A. Tacitus' Order of Events:—

A. 'Eodem anno—[viz.: Ti. Claudio quintum Servio Cornelio Orfito consulibus: viz.: 51 A.D.] bellum inter Armenios Hiberosque exortum.' Pharasmanes of Iberia sends his son Radamistus to invade Armenia, then under rule of Pharasmanes' brother Mithradates. The war actually begins then in this year.—xii. 44.

B. Mithradates besieged in Gorneae, where is a Roman garrison under Caelius Pollio, prefect, and Casperius, centurion.—xii. 45.

C. Radamistus offers bribes to Pollio to betray Gorneae. Casperius protests and departs (i) to dissuade Pharasmanes from prosecuting the war, failing which (ii.) to inform Ummidius Quadratus, legate of Syria, of the state of Armenia.—*ib.*

D. Casperius reaches Pharasmanes. Meanwhile Pollio has been urging Mithradates to surrender.—xii. 46.

E. Message from Pharasmanes to Radamistus, warning him 'oppugnationem quoquo modo celerare.' The bribe offered Pollio is increased and the soldiers are incited to compel Mithradates to surrender.—*ib.*

F. Meeting of Mithradates and Radamistus. Seizure and slaying of the former. Radamistus seizes the kingship of Armenia.—xii. 47.

G. Quadratus hears of this (? from Casperius) and calls a Council of War. This decides to do nothing save send envoys to Pharasmanes bidding him withdraw from Armenia and recall Radamistus.—xii. 48.

H. Julius Paelignus, procurator of Cappadocia, collects provincial auxilia 'tamquam reciperaturus Armeniam,' plunders his allies rather than the enemy, is deserted by his men, on 'a barbarian incursion' flees to Radamistus, and, bribed by him, urges him to put on the royal insignia and is present, 'auctor et satelles,' at the coronation.—xii. 49.

I. Quadratus hears of Paelignus' proceedings and despatches Helvidius Priscus, legate, with one legion from Syria, to mend matters.—*ib.*

K. Priscus crosses Mount Taurus and has already restored order in a large measure when

L. Quadratus sends and recalls him to Syria, 'ne initium belli adversus Parthos existeret,' he hearing of Vologeses' intentions and preparations to set Tiridates on the throne of Armenia.—*ib.* and 50.

[NOTE.—Mommsen (E.T. II. p. 49) speaks of Q. recalling 'the legion put upon the march from Syria,' as though Priscus had never reached his destination whether this was Cappadocia, or, as Mommsen suggests, Armenia. Tac. words certainly prove he *did* reach it and *had* spent some time there before recall].

M. Vologeses, King of Parthia, invades Armenia to set his brother Tiridates on the throne.—xii. 50.

N. Radamistus and the Iberians 'sine acie pulsi.' The Armenian cities Artaxata and Tigranocerta submit. First flight of Radamistus.—*ib.*

O. '*Deinde atrox hiems*' and insufficient supplies compel Vologeses to retreat from Armenia.—*ib.*

P. 'Vacua Armenia,' [*i.e.* Tiridates has also withdrawn].—*ib.*

Q. Radamistus returns again to Armenia, thus left without a ruler, and makes himself king for the second time.—*ib.*

R. Harsh rule of Radamistus in Armenia.—*ib.*

S. Rising of Armenians against Radamistus. Second flight of Radamistus with his wife Zenobia, whom, as unable to accompany him further, he stabs and casts into the river Araxes. She is found by shepherds and carried to Artaxata.—xii. 51

T. Zenobia brought from Artaxata to Tiridates and treated kindly by him.—*ib.*

[Immediately following on this Tacitus opens the next chapter with the words 'Fausto Sulla Salvio Othone consulibus,' viz. :

the consuls of 52 A.D. (xii. 52, 1).

There is no mention of events in the East again till Book xiii. c. 5, in the year 54 A.D., viz :—

U. Armenian envoys appear at Rome and plead before Nero.—xiii. 5.

[Nero became Emperor on 13th Oct. A.D. 54].

V. 'Fine anni' (viz. A.D. 54) 'turbidis rumoribus prorupisse rursum Parthos et rapi Armeniam adlatum est, pulso Radamisto, qui saepe regni eius potitus, dein profugus, tum quoque bellum deseruerat. Igitur in urbe sermonum avida, quem ad modum princeps, vix septemdecim annos egressus, suscipere eam molem aut propulsare posset . . . anquirebant.' —xiii. 6.

[Nero was 17 years old on Dec. 16, A.D. 54].

W. Nero's provisions for war with Parthia. (See *Second Paper*).

In this narrative Tacitus marks clearly

(*a*) The beginning of the war in 51 A.D.—(A).

(*b*) The news of Radamistus' last expulsion reaches Rome by rumour in December 54 A.D.—(V).

(*c*) A winter intervening at some point.—(O).

Expressly he narrates nothing whatever in the years 52 and 53 A.D. of these events. Hence the difficulty arises: do all the events A–T belong to 51 A.D. or are they to be distributed over the years 51–54 A.D.? And to which year belongs the 'winter' of 'O'?

B. The Rival Schemes:—

There are two arrangements of the chronology of these events.

1. *Nipperdey–Furneaux*:

The result of both editors' systems is the same, although there are slight differences in detail. Nipperdey (ad Ann. xii. 14) *e.g.* places the accession of Vologeses to the Parthian throne in the year 52–53, believing that the latest coins of his predecessor Vonones II. and the first of his own reign belong to the year from the autumn of 52 to that of 53. This necessarily causes him to place Vologeses' invasion of Armenia ('M') in 53 A.D.

Later numismatic research now makes it appear that the entire reign of Vonones II. was comprised in the Parthian months Panemus and Loius of the year 362 of the Seleucid Era, corresponding roughly to June and July A.D. 51. The accession of Vologeses then may be securely dated in August 51 A.D. (cf. P. Gardner, 'The Parthian Coinage'—International Numismata Orientalia, London 1877, pp. 22, 50, 51). Furneaux, however, accepting this, still follows Nipperdey in placing Vologeses' invasion in 53, save when he is inconsistent with himself. For it follows that the '*Atrox Hiems*' of 'O' is the winter of A.D. 53–54. This is Nipperdey's view and Furneaux adopts it in two places (ii. p. 106, n. 5; p. 278, col. 1). In one place (ii. p. 107, line 13) he calls it the winter of A.D. 52–53, which must be regarded as an oversight.

Then in A.D. 54 comes the final occupation of Armenia by the Parthians consequent on Radamistus' expulsion. This, as Furneaux well points out (ii. p. 106, n. 5), cannot have taken place before this year, as the news reaches Rome after the death of Claudius. And it follows essentially on this view that *the break in the Tacitean narrative between xii. 51 and xiii. 5 does not involve any break in time* i.e. that the expulsion of Radamistus in xiii. 5 is the second flight of xii. 51, and that the Tacitean narrative in xii. 44–51 covers the four years A.D. 51–54.

This then is the Nipperdey-Furneaux scheme, with which Mommsen (E.T. ii. p. 47) is in agreement :—

	A.D.	51. The peaceful intrigues of Radamistus preceding his first actual invasion of Armenia.
A–L	,,	52. The first invasion of Radamistus and its results.
M–N	,,	53. Invasion of Vologeses. First flight of Radamistus.
O–P	,,	53–54. The *atrox hiems*. Withdrawal of Vologeses.
Q–W	,,	54. Return of Radamistus and his second flight. Renewed occupation of Armenia by the Parthians, and Tiridates set on the throne. The news reaches Rome at the end of the year.

There are three main objections to this view, to be presently considered after presenting the rival scheme.

2. *Egli*:

This view follows more closely the apparent grouping of events by Tacitus. The actual invasion of Radamistus is placed

by Tacitus in 51 A.D. Vologeses coming to the throne (according to Egli in A.D. 50) seizes the earliest opportunity of invasion, viz., that same summer. The winter which compels his retreat is then that of 51–52 A.D. Tacitus then, before mentioning the consuls and other events of 52 A.D. into which year this winter conducts us, anticipates events, but only by a few months. The return and second flight of Radamistus will be in the spring or summer of 52 A.D., for the river Araxes into which Zenobia was cast was unfrozen and the flocks were evidently pasturing in the open ('S.'). Thus we reach the summer of 52 A.D., where the narrative breaks off in xii. 51.

The narrative is resumed late in 54 A.D. in xiii. 5. The break in the narrative thus implies a break in time, viz., from 52–54 A.D. Concerning the events of these years in Armenia, Tacitus is entirely silent, but we may suppose them filled with new quarrels between Tiridates and Radamistus, such as are indeed implied in Tacitus' words concerning the latter '*saepe* regni eius potitus, dein profugus,' (V) whereas in his actual narrative he has mentioned only *two* occasions when Radamistus acquired and then again lost possession of the Armenian throne—(F and Q). To suppose that his second flight is his last flight (as does the first scheme) makes 'saepe' mean 'on two occasions.' 'Das geht aber nicht an.'

Thus between the summer of 52 and 54 there must have occurred fresh quarrels between Radamistus and Tiridates, and more flights and more restorations of the former. But all this petty warfare was too unimportant for Tacitus' mention, and he resumes the narrative only when news of Radamistus' *final* expulsion reaches Rome and Nero thus, when Tiridates' possession of the throne is really a *fait accompli*, has to decide on a policy.

It follows then on this view that *the break in the Taciteau narrative between xii.* 51 *and xiii.* 5 *implies a considerable break in time.*

This then is the Egli scheme :—

A–L A.D. 51. summer. — Iberian-Armenian war.
M, N ,, ,, late summer.—Vologeses' invasion. Radamistus' flight.
O, P ,, 51–52. The '*atrox hiems*.' Withdrawal of Vologeses.
Q, R ,, 52. spring.— Return of Radamistus.
S, T ,, ,, summer.— Second flight of Radamistus. Return of Tiridates.
S, T ,, 53, 54. Unrecorded warfare.
U ,, 54. summer.—Armenian embassy to Rome.
V, W ,, 54. winter.—Nero's measures.

C. Discussion of the Schemes:

To both these schemes certain difficulties are attached.

Difficulties in 1 (*Nipperdey–Furneaux*):

(*a*) The actual beginning of the Iberian-Armenian war is placed by Tacitus in 51 A.D. It seems impossible to take the words 'eodem anno bellum exortum,' to apply merely to the preliminary treacherous plots of Radamistus, as does this scheme. Tacitus most certainly implies that actual hostilities began in 51 A.D., not in 52 A.D.

(*b*) Tacitus after narrating all the events A–T (xii. 44–51) proceeds at once to narrate the consuls and events of 52 A.D. This scheme makes A–T embrace the years 51–54 A.D., *i.e.*, anticipate the events of xii. 52, viz. of 52 A.D. by three years. Tacitus betrays not the least consciousness of any such great anticipation of events on his part. That there is some slight anticipation is obvious from his mention of the winter in O, which may be taken as equivalent to a direct assertion on his part that in order to secure continuity of treatment he has anticipated the events of the following year. [Such a direct assertion *e.g.*, we have in xiii. 9, 7: 'Quae in alios consules egressa coniunxi']. But though we are justified in supposing such slight anticipation in xii. 44–51, it is extending the principle unduly to make these chapters cover so long a period without any statement by Tacitus to that effect.

(*c*) Radamistus '*saepe* regni eius potitus' (V.) But this scheme with its immediate chronological connection of T and U, treating the Tacitean narrative as complete, must make 'saepe' actually come to mean 'on two occasions.' For Tacitus mentions only two occasions on which Radamistus seized the kingship (F and Q). Furneaux shows that he feels this an objection when he speaks of Radamistus 'keeping up some desultory warfare' between the date of his second flight and the end of

54 A.D. (Note to xiii. 6, 1.). Insisting on the word 'saepe' we must take Tacitus to imply warfare continuing which, however, he has not thought it worth while to record.

None of these difficulties are present in the second scheme. According to it the war does begin in 51 A.D. (*a*); the anticipation of events in the narrative reaches only to 52 A.D., viz., one year and not three (*b*); and it supposes more expulsions and restorations of Radamistus in the otherwise blank years 53 and 54, thus justifying the 'saepe' (*c*).

On the other hand the second scheme itself labours under a not inconsiderable disadvantage—apart from this supposition of two years' unrecorded warfare.

Difficulties in 2 (*Egli*):

This disadvantage is the very great compression of events in the year 51 A.D. The campaigning summer in Armenia is at most five months, from May to September, though we may allow one additional month for campaigning in Southern Armenia. The campaign opens with a siege in the extreme North, viz.: at Gorneae = Bash Garni, a few miles east of Erivan, and north of the Araxes, and the natural place for a garrison-outpost of Artaxata. Thus it can hardly begin before May. From thence onwards many events are recorded, all taking much time. These are (1) the blockade of Gorneae; (2) the negotiations with Pollio; (3) the journey of Casperius to Pharasmanes; (4) the message from Pharasmanes to Radamistus; (5) the surrender of Mithradates; (6) the time taken for the news of this to reach Quadratus and Paelignus; (7) Paelignus' preparations and expedition; (8) his flight to Radamistus; (9) the time taken for the news of this to reach Quadratus; (10) Quadratus' consequent measures; (11) Priscus' march over Taurus; (12) Priscus' stay and restoration of order (?) in Armenia; (13) the time taken for Quadratus' message of recall to reach Priscus; (14) Vologeses' invasion; (15) surrender of Artaxata; (16) surrender of Tigranocerta; (17) the winter.

Now on this scheme all these events are crowded into some five months. Surely the compression is too great. This impression is strengthened when the attention is directed chiefly to the later events here mentioned.

Egli supposes that Vologeses came to the throne of Parthia in 50 A.D., or at least early enough in 51 to allow him to invade Armenia in the summer.

But it appears he came to the throne only in August 51 (cf. supra). He then after this has

(i.) To plan the overthrow of Radamistus and make all his preparations for an invasion of Armenia, which preparations last long enough for Quadratus in Syria to hear of them and send to recall Priscus in consequence (L).

(ii.) To invade Armenia and receive the submission of the two widely distant towns of Artaxata in the extreme north, and Tigranocerta in the extreme south, over 450 kilometers away as the crow flies, before winter compels his retreat. (N).

For all this, on this scheme, but a bare two to three months at most is available. Egli very justly assumes that Vologeses is eager to carry out his compact with his brother Tiridates and invade Armenia as soon as possible. Moreover, winter evidently surprised him before his work was done. Yet on the scheme, the time even so seems far too short, the more closely the difficulties of campaigning in Armenia are considered. The capture of Artaxata and Tigranocerta, as I hope to show later, took Corbulo one whole campaigning year, though the resistance offered him was of the slightest. Thus the general impression produced by this scheme is one of a well-nigh impossible crowding of events into the one year 51 A.D.

D. Conclusion:—

Of the difficulties urged against the first scheme, the first is certainly valid. An attempted answer to the third is, as it is presented in Nipperdey and repeated by Furneaux, partially misleading. Nipperdey quotes one other passage in Tacitus to prove use of 'saepe' meaning 'twice.' This passage, the reference to which is re-inserted in Furneaux, does not prove his case.

In Ann. iii. 18, 2, Tacitus speaks of Tiberius as 'satis firmus, ut saepe memoravi, adversus pecuniam.' There are only two passages, declares Nipperdey, where Tacitus mentions this trait in Tiberius' character, viz. i. 75 and ii. 47. Hence here in iii. 18, 2 'saepe' is used loosely and rhetorically for 'twice.'

But this supposed parallel does not hold good. For in

i. 75—Tacitus mentions two instances of Tiberius' generosity, viz. to Pius Aurelius and Propertius Celer: similarly in
ii. 47—to twelve cities of Asia: and in
ii. 48—comments on his 'private' as well as his 'public' generosity, viz. to Aemilius Lepidus and M. Servilius, adding the general statement 'neque hereditatem cuiusquam adiit nisi cum amicitia meruit.'

Tacitus then is more justified in stating that he had 'frequently' mentioned cases of Tiberius' firmness 'adversus pecuniam' than we are in saying he has mentioned it twice only.

Doubtless there are certain kindred loose usages of words—as of 'semper' in xv. 47, for 'on two occasions': of 'omnes' in i. 13, 3—applying really to 'three' only (not 'two,' as Nipperdey): of 'tot' in the 'tot per annos' in vi. 24 as really meaning 'three' years only (as Dio lviii. 3 shows). Tacitus does allow himself a certain loose rhetorical exaggeration, and this may possibly extend to 'saepe' in xiii. 6. And here it would be the easier to suppose this as, though Tacitus states the 'saepe regni potitus, dein profugus' directly as his own remark, yet it may very well be but the repetition of the rumours then current in Rome, and popular talk is not apt to care for statistical accuracy.

We may on this point conclude that there is no absolute impossibility in supposing that Radamistus seized the kingship twice only, despite the 'saepe': *i.e.* that this word 'saepe' is no absolute bar to accepting a scheme which connects xii. 51 without any great interval of time with xiii. 5. But nothing is gained for this view of the case by adducing iii. 18, 2 as a confirmatory parallel.

As regards the second objection, that there must be some anticipation of events in Tacitus xii. 44–51 is certain. *Ceteris paribus*, the scheme which involves the least anticipation is preferable to its rivals.

The objection to the second scheme of over-crowding of events is so far valid that on this ground some other scheme involving their fairer distribution would be preferable. It must be admitted, however, that the fairer the distribution, the greater the anticipation of events is. No scheme, therefore, can be devised which is not liable to one or other objection. Inasmuch as the fact of some anticipation is admitted, perhaps it is better in the final choice rather to seek a distribution of events which shall be possible than to endeavour to avoid their anticipation.

Coming then to the final choice, it is important to insist on the following points of probability for guidance:—

(1) The first invasion of Radamistus took place in 51 A.D.
(2) The whole course of events which followed this necessarily implies the lapse of a considerable amount of time. Especially this is true of the expeditions of Paelignus and of Priscus, and of the stay of the latter in Armenia spent in the restoration of order.
(3) Radamistus therefore probably remained for some time in possession of the throne of Armenia before his expulsion by Vologeses.
(4) Vologeses did not ascend the Parthian throne until August 51 A.D.
(5) The whole course of events which followed this necessarily implies, in view of the geography and climate of Armenia, the lapse of more time than is remaining available in that year: viz. his preparations for the invasion of Armenia, which are long enough for Quadratus to hear of them and send to recall Priscus: his actual invasion, and the submission to him of the widely separated towns of Artaxata and Tigranocerta.
(6) Radamistus probably remained some time in possession of the throne of Armenia after his return, because his harsh rule compels the 'patient' Armenians to rise against him, and for this 'patientia' to be overcome by his severity requires some considerable duration of rule.
(7) News of his final expulsion by Tiridates reaches Rome by Dec. A.D. 54 and possibly a month or two earlier.

The scheme which satisfies these points I construct as follows.

A–K A.D. 51. Invasion of Radamistus. Surrender and death of Mithradates. Expeditions of Paelignus and Priscus. Radamistus on the throne.

L–N ,, 52. Invasion of Vologeses. Flight of Radamistus.
O–P ,, 52–53. The *atrox hiems*. Withdrawal of Vologeses.
Q–R ,, 53. Return and harsh rule of Radamistus.
S–W ,, 54. Expulsion of Radamistus. Return of Tiridates. News of this reaches Rome.

Compared with the two schemes hitherto suggested, this third one presents certain advantages.

It is entirely devoid of the objection of over-crowding of events, which goes far to invalidate the second scheme.

Of the three objections to the first scheme, it gets rid entirely of the first. It does imply an anticipation of events by Tacitus which is more considerable than that implied by the second scheme. But that is, as I have suggested, probably a lesser evil than that of over-crowding, with a consequent blank record for at least two years. That Tacitus seems entirely unconscious of any such blank years is to be taken into consideration. In this third scheme 'saepe' must be taken as rhetorically used of but a double acquisition of the kingdom. And xiii. 5 is taken to follow chronologically closely on xii. 51—allowing that Tiridates' return took place in the interim—itself doubtless a matter of some time. It seems also to have been in these years A.D. 53–54 that Vologeses was kept busy in Parthia by his preparations for attacking Izates, the feudatory king of Adiabene, and by an invasion of Parthia by the Dahae (Josephus *Ant. Jud.* xx. 4. Rawlinson, 'Parthia' c. 16). This would fit in well with the third scheme, which allows Radamistus to rule undisturbed in 53–54 A.D., until he is expelled, not by the Parthians, but by his own subjects, whose patience at last gives way.

On the whole it seems to me that if we had to choose between the first and second schemes, that of Egli is preferable. But a third scheme may be devised of greater probability and fewer difficulties than either. And this third scheme I have here suggested.

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(*To be continued.*)

THE DISCOVERIES OF POGGIO.—A CORRECTION.

I HAVE in two previous articles published in this *Review* (July 1896 and March 1899), discussed some questions concerning two Madrid MSS. which contain certain works discovered by Poggio in 1416–1418. The general conclusion to which I came was that, while the first of these (X 81), containing Asconius and Valerius Flaccus, was in all probability written by Poggio himself, the second (M 31), containing Manilius and the Silvae of Statius, was written for him by a Swiss or German scribe. I also ventured to make some suggestions concerning the MSS. of Silius Italicus, an author discovered shortly afterwards by Poggio, or by his colleague in the work of discovery, Bartolomeo de Montepoliciano. The only one of these authors concerning whom I was in a position to speak with any degree of authority was Asconius, since, although I have examined or collated the principal MSS. of Valerius Flaccus, I have not been able to make any minute study of him. With regard to the Silvae of Statius and Silius Italicus I merely threw out suggestions for students of these authors to consider.

The main point in favour of which I argued in my second article has not been controverted, viz. that M 31 is the copy of Manilius and the Silvae made for Poggio by a local scribe of whom he speaks in a letter to F. Barbaro which I found in a Bodleian MS. (Canonici. Misc. 484). Klotz in his recent edition (Teubner, 1900), after quoting from the letter in question states without further argument the conclusion to which it points. To what extent his conviction is based upon my article or independently arrived at by himself or Dr. Krohn is a point upon which he is silent.

A suggestion which I made with regard to Silius Italicus was advanced in view of the statement made by Blass that all existing MSS. are derived from one copy brought to Italy by Bartolomeo de Montepoliciano. This appeared to me unlikely in itself and to be disproved by Poggio's letter to F.

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table of the law)? In this case they supply another particular in which the Apostle reproduces Our Lord's answer to the lawyer (St. Mark 12 § 31). Not only, then, does he quote *ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὡς ἑαυτὸν*, but refers to it as a second commandment. This view is supported by the circumstance that St. Paul himself uses *τὸν πλησίον* in § 10 for 'neighbour'; he does not only quote it: and in § 9 has *εἴ τις ἑτέρα ἐντολή*, where he is summing up the commandments that come in the Second Table.

T. NICKLIN.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WARS IN ARMENIA, A.D. 51—63.

II.—A.D. 54–60.

THE first few years of this period give us very little difficulty: the last are the most perplexing of this whole period A.D. 51–63.

A.D. 54 (Dec.) –57.

Tacitus' Order of Events:—

A.D. 54. Dec. Nero has to determine on an Armenian policy.—xiii. 6. (Cf. previous paper).

„ 54. Dec.–55 init. Nero makes preparations for war: viz., orders new enrolments for Eastern legions: mobilisation of troops: construction of bridges over the Euphrates. Corbulo is appointed 'retinendae Armeniae' &c., xiii. 7. 8.

„ 55. (? spring) Corbulo hurries to the East to take over the command in Cappadocia (while Quadratus remains in command in Syria), and meets Quadratus at Aegeae in Cilicia, who hands over to him half his forces as directed by Nero.

Consequent division of forces:

In Syria with Quadratus: 2 legions (viz. X Fretensis and XII Fulminata) and part of auxiliaries.

In Cappadocia with Corbulo: 2 legions (viz. III Gallica and VI Ferrata): part of auxiliaries, sent him by Quadratus from Syria: and all cohorts and alae then in Cappadocia.

The client kings of Lesser Armenia, Commagene, &c., are ordered to assist either Corbulo or Quadratus as seems advisable. Most choose the former. xiii. 7. 8.

Meantime: 'Exortusque in tempore aemulus Vologesi filius Vardanes; et abscessere Armenia Parthi, tamquam differrent bellum.' xiii. 7, 2.

Coins date this revolt of Vardanes as lasting at least from November 55 to June 58. (Gardner 'Parthian Coinage,' pp. 13, 51.) The revolt may easily have begun some months earlier, and the news of it seems to have reached Rome after Corbulo's appointment: whether or no before his departure for the East cannot be told. Hence we may continue:—

A.D. 55 (? summer). Revolt of Vardanes.

The Parthians evacuate Armenia.

Corbulo arrives in Cappadocia.

„ 55. Messages sent to Vologeses by both Corbulo and Quadratus, demanding 'pacem quam bellum mallet datisque obsidibus

solitam prioribus reverentiam in populum Romanum continuaret.' xiii. 9, 1.

Vologeses hands over as hostages 'nobilissimos ex familia Arsacidarum,' either 'quo bellum ex commodo pararet an ut aemulationis suspectos per nomen obsidum amoveret.' xiii. 9, 2.

Corbulo and Quadratus quarrel at length as to which deserves the credit for making Vologeses give hostages. Nero seeks to heal the breach. xiii. 9.

Vologeses evidently did not desire war at once on Corbulo's arrival. When he gave the hostages the revolt of Vardanes probably had already broken out and gave him cause to be suspicious of his nobles (xiii. 9. 2). Otherwise there existed no reason for his desire to postpone the war, a desire distinctly to his foe's advantage. As the envoy from Syria reached him before the envoy from Cappadocia, he was probably in the S. of Armenia, engaged in withdrawing his troops who had accompanied Tiridates on his last seizure of the throne (cf. previous paper).

Tacitus tells us nothing more of Armenian affairs until under the year A.D. 58 he resumes the subject thus:—

> 'Eius anni principio mollibus adhuc initiis prolatatum inter Parthos Romanosque de obtinenda Armenia bellum acriter resumitur, quia nec Vologeses sinebat fratrem Tiridatem dati a se regni expertem esse aut alienae id potentiae donum habere, et Corbulo dignum magnitudine populi Romani rebatur parta olim a Lucullo Pompeioque recipere.' xiii. 34, 4.

The position of Tiridates in this interval A.D. 55–58 thus becomes of interest. After Corbulo's first campaign he sends to ask indignantly

> 'Cur datis nuper obsidibus redintegrataque amicitia . . . vetere Armeniae possessione depelleretur.' (xiii. 37, 4.)

To which Corbulo answers as follows:—

> 'Suadet Tiridati precibus Caesarem adgredi: posse illi regnum stabile et res incruentas contingere, si omissa spe longinqua et sera praesentem potioremque sequeretur.' (xiii. 37, 6.)

From these passages it appears that the giving of hostages in A.D. 55 amounted to a 'redintegrata amicitia': that in A.D. 58 Tiridates can talk of a vetus possessio of Armenia: and that Corbulo practically admits his previous 'regnum' in denying its stability under existing conditions.

Tiridates, that is, must have remained in possession of the throne of Armenia in A.D. 55 despite the withdrawal of Vologeses and his Parthian troops. But it seems he never acknowledged the Roman suzerainty. The question now at issue between Rome and Parthia was the right of 'bestowing that throne as a gift,' as Tacitus puts it. Tiridates may be de facto recipient of the donum. Who is to be recognised as lawful donor, *i.e.*, as suzerain?

Tiridates, remaining in possession of the Armenian throne, does not, despite Vologeses' giving of hostages, recognise the Roman claim to suzerainty. At a time then when Vologeses has got the better of Vardanes' revolt and has his hands free again, it is important for Corbulo to bestir himself and impress upon Tiridates the uncertainty of his tenure, somewhat to Tiridates' surprise and indignation. To 'recover Armenia' in Roman official language need not mean more than the obtaining of this recognition of Roman suzerainty. And of course if the Vologeses who is King of Parthia after 58 A.D. is not Rome's old opponent but a new king, the need and opportunity for Roman action are alike emphasized. But on the whole the numismatic evidence in favour of this supposition seems to me outweighed by the historic evidence against it. (Cf. Gardner 'Parthian Coinage,' p. 52).

Thus far we therefore obtain these results:—

A.D. 55. Revolt of Vardanes. Vologeses evacuates Armenia. Corbulo arrives in Cappadocia. Agreement between Vologeses and Corbulo.

„ 55–58. Tiridates in possession of Armenia.

„ 58. End of Vardanes' revolt. Be-

ginning of war 'keenly' in Armenia.

At this point the chief chronological difficulty begins.

A.D. 57–60.

A. Order of Events in Tacitus:—

A. 'Eius anni principio (viz: 58 A.D.) mollibus adhuc initiis prolatatum inter Parthos Romanosque de obtinenda Armenia bellum acriter resumitur.' *i.e.* Active hostilities begin.—xiii. 34. 4.

B. Corbulo's chief difficulty is the lack of discipline &c. in his army, especially in the Syrian legions sent him (in 55 A.D.) by Quadratus. Many unfit are discharged. Hence new levies in Galatia and Cappadocia. A legion summoned from Germany.—35. 1–3.

[This was probably Leg. IV Scythica: and as in xiii. 40. 3 Corbulo has under his command part at least if not all the Leg. X Fretensis, which in the original division remained in Syria with Quadratus (cf. supra), it is possible that the new legion's arrival in Syria caused the transfer of Leg. X to Corbulo].

C. Winter: Corbulo, despite the fierce cold, keeps his troops under canvas 'donec ver adolesceret.' The auxiliary cohorts are sent on garrison duty to fit spots under supervision of Paccius Orfitus; strict orders are given against engaging the enemy. Orfitus disobeys these and suffers a reverse. 35. 5–36. 5.

[Corbulo evidently winters in hostile territory, viz. Armenia. The severity of the winter agrees with this].

D. Spring: Beginning of active hostilities. Tiridates with the aid of troops sent him by Vologeses carries on an active guerilla warfare, always eluding Corbulo's attempts to catch him, his forces being 'equestres copiae' (xiii. 40. 1.). This continues a long while '*diu*.'—37. 1. 2.

[*i.e.* Corbulo's first plan of campaign consists of a general pursuit of the Armenian De Wet].

E. Corbulo borrows a leaf from his enemy's book and sends out several detached columns to attack different places at one and the same time. Antiochus of Commagene is ordered to co-operate. Pharasmanes and the Moschi also make incursions into Armenia in the Roman interest. Vologeses cannot come to the aid of Tiridates, because himself detained by the Hyrcanian revolt.—37. 2–4.

[*i.e.* Corbulo's second plan of campaign consists of pursuit &c. by flying columns. This is so far successful that—]

F. Tiridates makes overtures to Corbulo and proposes an interview. Corbulo assents, but (cf. Caesar and Ariovistus) takes such precautions that Tiridates' intended treachery fails and the interview is a fiasco.—37. 4–38. 7.

G. Renewal of hostilities. Tiridates fails in an attempt to intercept Corbulo's convoys coming from Trapezus and thus cut his line of communication.—39. 1. 2.

H. Corbulo—to put an end to the war—determines to attack Armenian forts [*i.e.* his third plan of campaign], thus abandoning his direct pursuit of Tiridates. Three main divisions of the Roman army are constituted for this purpose, under Corbulo himself, Cornelius Flaccus legate, and Insteius Capito, camp-prefect.—xiii. 39. 2.

I. Storming of Volandum by Corbulo's division, and taking of smaller forts by the other two. 'Unde orta fiducia caput gentis Artaxata adgrediendi.'—39. 2–7.

J. March to Artaxata. Tiridates makes a vain demonstration *en route* and then flees away to Media.—39. 7–41. 2.

K. Surrender (next day) of Artaxata.—41. 3.

L. Burning of Artaxata to the ground by Corbulo, as he had not enough men both to garrison the city and to prosecute the war, and if evacuated its capture would have been worthless.

'Adicitur miraculum velut numine oblatum: nam cuncta Artaxatis tenus sole inlustria fuere; quod moenibus cingebatur repente ita atra nube coopertum fulguribusque discretum est ut quasi infensantibus deis exitio tradi crederetur.'—41. 4.

M. News of the fall of Artaxata reaches Rome. Public rejoicings and senatorial debate and decrees.—41. 5.

[*After which*—'Deinde'—Suillius is condemned at Rome and Tacitus relates various other events of the year A.D. 58. He then narrates events of the years 59 and 60 A.D. resuming his narrative of Eastern warfare in his annals of this year 60 A.D. with the words :]

N. 'At Corbulo post deleta Artaxata utendum recenti terrore ratus ad occupanda Tigranocerta...illuc pergit.'—xiv. 23. 1.

March from Artaxata to Tigranocerta in '*glowing summer time*,' the army harassed by the Mardi *en route* and very greatly suffering for lack of water and grain until its arrival in 'loci culti.' Two forts are taken, one by storm, one by blockade. Continued march through 'regio Tauraunitium' to Tigranocerta.—23. 1–24. 5.

O. Surrender of Tigranocerta without resistance.—24. 6. 7.

P. Defence of and storming of the fort Legerda.—25. 1.

[NOTE.—Vologeses is still detained by the Hyrcanian revolt. Envoys from the Hyrcanians to Nero had before these last events been sent to Rome and now on their return are by Corbulo sent round by a long and circuitous route to reach their own land, lest the Parthians should capture them.—xiv. 25. 2. 3].

Q. Tiridates invades Armenia again from Media.—xiv. 26. 1.

R. Corbulo despatches Verulanus, legate, with advanced guard, and follows himself with the legions by forced marches.—26. 1.

S. Tiridates is thus forced to flee far away and give up all hopes of war.—26. 1.

T. Corbulo ravages and burns the unfriendly districts of Armenia. He is making effective his occupation of Armenia when—26. 1.

U. Tigranes, sent by Nero to take over the kingdom, arrives at this juncture. —26. 1.

V. Tigranes is accepted as king by the majority of Armenians.—26. 2.

W. Corbulo makes arrangements for his security. He leaves a garrison for him in Armenia and makes various frontier readjustments in order to enlist the neighbouring client-kings in his support.—26. 3.

X. Corbulo retires into Syria, then left vacant by the recent death of Quadratus and therefore assigned to him. —26. 4.

[This is definitely assigned by the 'eodem anno' following to the year A.D. 60].

A'. Points of Time etc. here to be observed :

Certain preliminary points in the Tacitus narrative suggesting definite times, seasons, and dates, must here be noted :—

1. Corbulo winters in Armenia (C).
2. Active hostilities begin in Spring (D)—viz. : acc. to xiii. 34, 1 that of 58 A.D. (A).
3. Corbulo's first plan of campaign is tried 'a long time' (D).
4. Corbulo marches on Artaxata immediately it seems after the capture of Volandum and the other forts. (I, J).
5. News of the fall of Artaxata reaches Rome, according to the 'Deinde' of xiii. 42, 1 in 58 A.D. (M).
6. The burning of Artaxata is spoken of by Tacitus in one and the same breath as its surrender. The language entirely fails to suggest that any interval of time separated the capture of the city, the destruction of the city, and the resumed march to Tigranocerta. (K, L, N). Entirely consistent with this is Tacitus' statement that
7. While terror at the news of Artaxata's destruction is still 'fresh' Corbulo marches for Tigranocerta (N).
8. The march to Tigranocerta must have taken place in hot summer—the arrival there in late autumn. Thus the crops are ripe in 'loci culti' near Tauraunitis, and it is no uncommon thing for the corn to be still unripe in Southern Armenia even in the beginning of August (cf. Egli, p. 288). The march, too, must have taken some time. The distance—some 500 kil. as the crow flies—through rough country with fighting on the way, the taking of one fort by storm, another by blockade, etc., all this necessitates the conclusion that Tigranocerta cannot have surrendered before September (N, O).
9. Tigranocerta surrenders at once : but Legerda has to be taken by storm (P).
10. The campaigning season in Armenia ends in October at latest.
11. Corbulo finally retires into Syria in A.D. 60 (X).

12. Thus there are three campaigns among which all the events must be in some manner or other distributed, viz: those of the three years 58, 59, 60 A.D.

A''. The 'Miraculum' at Artaxata :—

One other preliminary question must be considered at somewhat greater length.

Egli (p. 285) identifies the 'miraculum' which preceded the destruction of Artaxata (L) with an eclipse of the sun which occurred on April 30th, A.D. 59. According to Pliny (N. H. ii. 70. 72, 180), Corbulo in Armenia saw this eclipse 'inter horam diei decimam et undecimam.'

The identification of this eclipse of the sun with the Artaxata miraculum leads Egli to give to the capture of the city the very precise date mentioned, viz: April 30th A.D. 59.

Certainly could this be accepted it would form an excellent starting point for chronological considerations both backwards and forwards. But it is entirely impossible to accept this identification. Tacitus, who himself knows of this eclipse (xiv. 12, 3) entirely fails to identify his 'miraculum' with it, and his description of the latter is decisive:

> 'While the whole space outside the town up to its buildings was bright with sunlight, the enclosure within the walls was suddenly shrouded in a black cloud, seamed with lightning flashes.' (Church and Brodribb)

This description of a cloud-sunlight effect, however curiously regarded as a 'miracle,' must necessarily, *if we hold to the description*, be regarded as inconsistent with any possible effect of an eclipse of the sun, however partial. To follow Egli (p. 334, 340 etc.) and proceed to reproach the unlucky Corbulo for being 'strangely ignorant, and not knowing an eclipse of the sun when he saw it' seems to me an indulgence in a perversely topsy-turvy argument. Corbulo may have been 'child of his age' (the age be it noted of Pliny), but if he saw no eclipse of the sun at Artaxata, the probability is that there was no eclipse of the sun to see. If he saw a novel effect of cloud, sunshine and storm, he described it, clearly and well.[1]

We must, however reluctantly, abandon the precise date for the capture of Artaxata, April 30th, A.D. 59.

B. The Schemes proposed :—

I. EGLI. (P. 282-290). [Adopted by Schiller without criticism or discussion]	II. MOMMSEN (E.T. II. P. 53, 54).	III. FURNEAUX (II. P. 111-115 ETC.) [Following Nipperdey, who however does not divide up A.D. 59, 60 so precisely].	IV. 'COMPROMISE.'
i. Q–X are all closely connected and thus must be in same year — viz.: A.D. 60.	i. The account in Tac. Bk. XIV. 'evidently describes merely one single campaign.'	i. Insisting on A'8, there must be a break between P–Q.	i. Insisting on A' 5, viz.: L=58 A.D.
ii. P and Q must belong to different years, as P is late in the year [A' 8].	*i.e.* N–X=A.D. 60.	*i.e.* Q–X=A.D. 60.	A' 2, viz.: D=58 A.D.
And insisting on A' 6, L and O–P must be in the same year. Thus the break in Tac. narrative between M–N does not imply a break in time.	ii. As Corbulo sees the eclipse of 59 A.D. on Armenian soil the account in Tac. Bk. XIII. embraces 2 campaigns separated by the winter C.	ii. The break in Tac. narrative between M–N implies a break in time.	A' 6, viz.: L, N, O, P, all are in same year,
	Thus A–C=58 A.D.	*i.e.* P=A.D. 59.	we get necessarily
	D–K=59 A.D.	iii. Insisting on A' 5, K must have occurred in A.D. 58.	D–P=58 A.D.
		And besides to couple D–P together is too much for one year.	ii. Thus leaving Q–X for 2 years A.D. 59–60.
			Of this 2 arrangements are possible.
			(1) A.D. 59. no events. A.D. 60. Q–X.

[1] If Pliny's words 'circuitu globi alia aliis detegente et occultante' are to be taken to refer to the same phenomenon as that which Tacitus thus describes, we must credit Pliny with the mistake of identifying Corbulo's miraculum with the eclipse, supposing it probable that Tacitus reproduces Corbulo's own accurate description. For the shadow of an eclipse could hardly be confined within the small circuit of a city wall. But as Corbulo certainly was in Armenia when the eclipse occurred, and Pliny, however distant, would scarcely have made the error, it is better to dissociate the Pliny and Tacitus passages entirely.

I. Egli. (P. 282-290). [Adopted by Schiller without criticism or discussion].	II. Mommsen (E.T. II. p. 53, 54).	III. Furneaux (II. p. 111-115 etc.) [Following Nipperdey, who however does not divide up A.D. 59, 60 so precisely).	IV. 'Compromise.'
iii. But D to P is too much for one year and D is 58 A.D. And the winter being a natural time for the negotiations of F—hence divide D-F. 58 A.D. G-P. 59 A.D. iv. K-L = April 30. 59 A.D.	iii. Corbulo then must have wintered in Artaxata, marching for Tigranocerta in the spring of A.D. 60.	Thus L and N-P= A.D. 59. and D-K+M=A.D. 58. iv. The winter C is thus that of A.D. 57-58, as suits A' 2. v. Corbulo then must have wintered in Artaxata.	or (2) A.D. 59. Q-U. A.D. 60. V-X. iii. The winter C is that of A.D. 57-58, as suits A' 2.

I. Summary.		II. Summary.	III. Summary.	IV. Summary.	
A.D. 57	A-B		A-B	A-B	
Winter 57-58	C		C	C	
58	D-E	A-B	D-K+M	D-P	
Winter 58-59	F	C			
59	G-P	D-K	L+N-P	(1) —	(2) Q-U
60	Q-X	L+N-X	Q-X	Q-X	V-X

Objections.	Objections.	Objections,	Objections.
Main :— Entire neglect of A' 5. Minor :— 1. ? Neglect of the Break in Tac. narrative between L-N. But Tac. himself in N closely connects the two (A' 6). 2. The miraculum-eclipse identification (cf. *supra*). But the rejection of this leaves the general scheme untouched, if depriving it of a positive argument in its favour. 3. See III.	Main :— 1. Entire neglect of A' 2. 2. Ditto of A' 5. 3. Ditto of A' 6. 4. Ditto of A' 8. 5. Ditto of A' 10. For 1. B can hardly satisfy the *acriter* bellum resumitur. 2. For ex hyp. Artaxata falls in A.D. 59. 3. For ex hyp. Corbulo winters in Artaxata. 4. To allow time for all events Q-X in same year Tigranocerta must surrender at least in early summer.	Main :— Entire neglect of A' 6. Minor :— 1. ? Too few events are ascribed to 59 A.D. 2. 'Tacitus where he condenses as a rule anticipates' (Mommsen.) But ex hyp. N-P belong to 59 A.D. *i.e.* the year before that under which Tac. in xiv. 23 seems to place them. Applies also to I.	Main :— Entire neglect of A' 10. For ex hyp. there is far too much for A.D. 58. Minor :— To (1) : The break in events does not correspond with any break in the narrative. To (2) : A forced solution of which there is no hint in Tac. And the 'Anticipation Rule' throughout is hopelessly broken.

C. Consideration of the Rival Views :—

I. *Egli's View* :

In itself this scheme is very attractive. The events are well and probably distributed among the years. Active hostilities begin, as Tacitus says, in A.D. 58. That year is filled up with Corbulo's first plan of campaign, which we are expressly told was tried for 'a long time,' and his

second plan which involved certainly great preparations and organisation, &c., *i.e.*, much time. And we must always remember that the Armenian campaigning season hardly exceeds four (acc. to Mommsen), or at the most five months. Then comes the 'unmentioned winter.' One such winter at least has on every scheme to be inserted into the Tacitus narrative. Negotiations between Tiridates and Corbulo very conveniently occupy it, on the temporary cessation of warfare enforced by it.

These failing, the year 59 opens with Corbulo's third plan of campaign. The capture of Volandum encourages him to proceed at once to Artaxata. Capturing the city he at once destroys it, as Tacitus' narrative irresistibly implies, because he cannot hold it, and marches for Tigranocerta. Naturally therefore he arrives here only in autumn, as Tacitus obviously implies. And the capture of Legerda closes the campaigning year—59—a full year, but not too full if we begin it with the third plan of campaign.

Then Tiridates' last attempt, Tigranes' arrival, and Corbulo's withdrawal to Syria, fall naturally into the year A.D. 60: events implying much duration of time, however compressed the account of them in Tacitus.

Thus the scheme as a whole is feasible and attractive. We are bound to reject Egli's 'miraculum-eclipse' identification, it is true. But in reality this is to the advantage of the scheme. For the capture of Artaxata on April 30—the result of the identification—certainly would make the campaign of A.D. 59 in the north of Armenia begin much too early. But rejecting the identification and thus the precise date, we can place the fall of Artaxata, *e.g.*, two months later, and thus be rid entirely of this objection which Furneaux brings against the scheme.

The objection against the scheme which remains and cannot be denied is that it places Artaxata's capture in 59 A.D. while Tacitus by his 'deinde' of xiii. 42, 1, clearly implies that the news of this reached Rome in the preceding year.

II. *Mommsen's View*:

This scheme is hopeless: there is practically nothing to be said for it. It combines all the main objections which can be urged against any scheme, and departs altogether from Tacitus. Tacitus says the war begins actively in 58 A.D. The scheme sets the first operations to which this description could possibly be applied in 59 A.D. Tacitus implies that the news of Artaxata's fall reached Rome in 58 A.D. The scheme puts the fall of the city in 59 A.D. There is neither word nor hint in Tacitus to imply that an interval of six months at least intervened between the capture and the burning of Artaxata, during which interval Corbulo wintered in the captured town. All this is supposed by the scheme. On the contrary Tacitus speaks of the capture and the burning in one and the same sentence, they making part of one and the same impression on the mind of the reader. And if any one certain fact is suggested by Tacitus' narrative, it is that Tigranocerta fell in the autumn. Yet the scheme is bound to set this in the spring, as so many events remain yet to be inserted into this same year.

The scheme indeed seems to be based on two generally enunciated Tacitean principles, viz.

(1) That a break in the Tacitus narrative implies a break in time; but where there is no break in the narrative the events belong to one and the same year unless the change of year is directly stated or obviously implied.

(2) That where Tacitus combines in one narrative-section events of two years he prefers to anticipate the coming, rather than hark back to the past, year.

Such general principles, however, are scarcely safe guides if they lead, as in this case, to the rejection of well-nigh every particular piece of evidence. This should rather lead us to modify our general conclusions, however painful the sacrifice. It cannot *e.g.* be seriously doubted that in this case the events from the return of Tiridates from Media to Corbulo's withdrawal into Syria cannot belong to the same year as that in the autumn of which Legerda fell.

The Mommsen scheme is distinctly inferior to Egli's when we consider the evidence.

III. *Furneaux's View*:

This view is also attractive and possible in itself. 58 A.D. is its full year, while perhaps there is not quite enough left for 59 A.D. which the march from Artaxata to Tigranocerta and the capture of Legerda are supposed entirely to occupy. In its account of A.D. 57–58 (spring) and A.D. 60 it is identical with Egli's scheme. True it supposes that Tacitus, writing annals of A.D. 60,

harks *back* to include those of A.D. 59. But if this be a blemish, it is common also to Egli's scheme as well.

Looking at the matter from the standpoint of the distribution of events among the years it is slightly inferior to the first scheme. From the more important standpoint of the evidence it is precisely on a level with this in so far as it satisfies all the ten criteria save one only. The great difficulty in this scheme is that it makes Corbulo winter at Artaxata, a fact of which, as has already been pointed out, Tacitus seems entirely ignorant. The 'utendum recenti terrore' passage will, it is true, square with this view as well as with Egli's, inasmuch as the terror is caused by the 'destruction' of Artaxata, which ex hyp. takes place in the spring of the year 59 just before Corbulo's march to Tigranocerta. And as a whole year is devoted to this march, Corbulo can be made to arrive at the latter city in the autumn, as required. But the one difficulty remains—that to separate the capture from the burning of Artaxata by six months runs counter to the general impression produced by the narrative.

IV. '*Compromise*':

As then the first view is opposed to one, and the third view to another, of the main Tacitean criteria, I devise this fourth scheme as an example of an attempt to reconcile these criteria, viz: to allow the news of Artaxata's fall to reach Rome in 58 *and* set the march to Tigranocerta in this same year.

The result, it must be admitted, is not very happy. By it we get a really impossibly full year of events for 58 A.D., considering the brief campaigning season in Armenia, and then are left with two years on our hands with not enough events for them both: with the result that we must either make one completely blank year, which is historically impossible, or spread the butter very thinly over the two years' slice, making an arbitrary division somewhere or other. It seems hardly possible that this can have been Tacitus' own idea of the division of the years, viz: that xiii. 37–41 + xiv. 23–25 belong all to one year while two years' events are compressed into xiv. 26, 1–4: and thus the sole justification for some such compromise-view, viz: fidelity to Tacitus, vanishes away, leaving us with an impossibly full year to face.

D. Conclusion:

Other rearrangements besides this suggested 'Compromise' can be made. But no one that I have devised but presents one or other of the difficulties named and added evils besides.

We may therefore confine our attention to the four schemes set forth above. And now we may reject the second and fourth views as distinctly inferior to the first and third.

Therefore we are compelled to make our choice between the first and third, viz: Egli's and Furneaux's. Each is attended by one great difficulty, involving a contradiction of one point of time suggested by Tacitus. That is, it is impossible to devise a scheme satisfying all ten Tacitean criteria. At least some one of these must be rejected.

Either Tacitus is mistaken when he declares that the news of the fall of Artaxata reached Rome in 58 A.D., or when he implies that Corbulo burnt Artaxata immediately after its capture and marched forthwith for Tigranocerta.

Thus (1) following Egli, we must believe that Tacitus ascribes to A.D. 58 proceedings in the Senate really belonging to A.D. 59.

or (2) following Furneaux, we must believe that Tacitus is ignorant of the fact that Corbulo winters in Artaxata after capturing that city in A.D. 58.

Which of these is more probable?

Considering Tacitus' probable sources, (1) for the proceedings in the Senate (2) for Corbulo's campaigns, I accept with small hesitation the first alternative.

For Senatorial proceedings Tacitus doubtless used the records of the Senate. And in view of the whole tenor of the narrative a mistakenly implied date is here not very unlikely. Having inserted in his Annals in its right place, under the year 58 A.D., the beginning of active hostilities and Corbulo's pursuit after Tiridates, Tacitus both harks back a little to explain Corbulo's previous preparations, and then carries the narrative forward to the next year to embrace Corbulo's first great and notable success, viz. the Artaxata capture, without a break. Naturally there follows on this an account of the reception of the news in Rome, wherein he 'anticipates' (cf. Mommsen's 'general rule') events of A.D. 59. The 'Deinde' with which afterwards he resumes the tale of events in Rome of 58 A.D. may

be regarded as a mere literary connecting particle, or a pure slip of the pen.

This supposition presents no very great inherent improbability. But such an improbability *does* seem involved in the only alternative to it, viz. Furneaux's view that Tacitus is ignorant that Corbulo wintered in Artaxata.

For his account of Corbulo's campaigns it seems clear that Tacitus consulted Corbulo's own despatches from the seat of war. Such a sentence as 'Corbulo post deleta Artaxata utendum recenti terrore ratus ad occupanda Tigranocerta' goes straight back to those despatches and reveals the general's hopes and strategy. Now had Corbulo wintered in Artaxata after taking the town and not burnt it until his evacuation (ex hyp.) in the following spring, it is hardly possible that this fact would not have appeared with some prominence in his despatches. It is impossible surely that Tacitus should have summarised them in so misleading or ignorant a manner, omitting entirely to notice the use to which Corbulo put the captured city. Strategically again, in view of the general's hopes and intentions, it was not only better for Corbulo to winter near his base of operations, the Cappadocian frontier, at Tigranocerta than far away in the inclement North at Artaxata, but also it is far less probable that his march from the Armenian Bloemfontein to the Armenian Pretoria was resumed only after a six months' interval of inactivity than that he destroyed the former at once for very excellent strategical considerations. These considerations duly make their appearance in Tacitus' narrative, albeit Tacitus is far removed as the poles asunder from being in any sense a strategist or military historian. Nor could any delay be caused to Corbulo's intentions to finish the war by a rapid advance by commissariat troubles or the thought of his lines of communication. For his army, as we are expressly told, lived on the country as it marched through it, however scanty the provender in consequence, and Corbulo in his dash from Artaxata sundered his force from his line of communications to open a new line in the south by his occupation of Tigranocerta.

This rapid and immediate advance from the one city to the other is as irresistibly implied throughout Tacitus' narrative as it is strategically far more probable than the opponent view. It is implied alike by the details he gives of Artaxata's treatment as by the obvious fact (though so curiously neglected by Mommsen) that he reached Tigranocerta only late in the year's campaign. It is Corbulo's own account which penetrates to the surface through and despite of Tacitus' unmilitary narrative, and herein lies its value and its strength as evidence.

Somewhere or another Tacitus omits to mention the passing of a winter. It is far more probable to suppose with Egli that this was a winter occupied by negotiations than with Furneaux that this was a winter during which Corbulo's army rusted inactively at distant Artaxata, if we consider the sources of Tacitus' account.

Hence I reject the third view and choose the first. Rejecting of course the positive date, April 30th, it champions, as based on Egli's untenable identification of the Artaxata miraculum with the eclipse, and thus securing, as I have suggested above, an additional advantage for the very scheme itself, I propose, following Egli otherwise, this scheme for the most probable chronology of the years A.D. 57–60:—

A, B.	A.D. 57.	Corbulo's preparations for war.
C.	winter 57–58.	Corbulo winters under canvas in Armenia.
D–E.	58.	The first year's campaign, in which Corbulo tries two plans of action, neither with great success, save that Tiridates enters into negotiations.
F.	winter 58–59.	The negotiations — with no result.
G–P.	59.	Hostilities resumed. Corbulo's new plan of campaign. Capture of Volandum and the forts. Surrender and destruction of Artaxata. Corbulo's rapid march to Tigranocerta. Surrender of the city in autumn. Storming of Legerda.
	winter 59–60.	Corbulo winters in Tigranocerta.
Q–X.	60.	Invasion of Tiridates from Media. Corbulo's march to meet him and his enforced retreat.

Q–X.	60. Corbulo over-runs Armenia. Arrival of Tigranes. Settlement of the country. Corbulo withdraws to Syria.	winter 60–61.	Corbulo in Syria. Tigranes in Armenia. Tiridates in Parthia.

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(*To be concluded.*)

SOME SUGGESTIONS ON CALPURNIUS SICULUS.

I. 73–76.

Exsultet quaecumque Notum gens ima iacentem
erectumue colit Boream, quaecumque uel ortu
uel patet occasu medioue sub aethere feruit.

These lines mean that every inhabitant of the world's five zones must rejoice in the new accession and the era of peace and prosperity which it is to usher in. The turn of the first of the clauses introduced by *quaecumque* is obviously antithetical, 'iacentem erectumue' (so Baehrens, the MSS –que). But there is no antithesis in the second. For *patet* we must read *t e p e t* which is properly opposed to *feruit*. So at v. 41 for '*p a t enti*', preserved in one family of the inferior MSS (*w*), the other family (*v*) writes *t e p enti*.

It is possible that the same change should be made at Tibullus 2. 5, 59 in the very difficult, and perhaps unexampled 'patent ortus.'

II. 51 *sqq.*

O si quis Crocalen deus afferat! hunc ego terris,
hunc ego sideribus solus regnare fatebor
secernamque nemus dicamque 'sub arbore numen
hac erit; ite procul (sacer est locus) ite profani.'

For *erit* Maehly proposed *est*, but a more pertinent and an easier correction would be *erat*. The sense is that 'the place is sacred because once a deity was there.' Confusion of the terminations *-it*, *-at*, and the like, is common enough; *e.g.* at *v.* 31, the MSS vary between 'crescit' and 'crescat.'

Among the marvellous beasts, snow-white hares, boars with horns and so forth, exhibited in the games given by the young emperor of Eclogue VII. the rustic Corydon tells us he saw the elk:

uidi genus omne ferarum,
hic niueos lepores et non sine cornibus apros,
hic raram siluis etiam quibus editur alcen.
(vii. 57–59).

The description of this animal 'as rare even in its native forests' might be thought insufficiently distinctive. But in itself that would be no reason for doubting the *Hic raram* of the vulgate in view of the passage of Pausanias ix. 21. 3, which I transcribe in Dr. Frazer's translation.

'There is a beast called the elk, in appearance between a stag and a camel; it is a native of the land of the Celts. It is the only beast we know of that cannot be tracked or seen afar off by man; but sometimes when men have gone out to hunt other game, chance throws an elk in their way. It smells man, they say, while it is still a great way off, and plunges into gullies and the deepest caverns. So the hunters surround the plain or mountain in a circle of at least a thousand furlongs, and taking care not to break the circle, they gradually close in, and so catch the animals inside the circle, the elks among the rest. But if the elk happens not to have its lair there, there is no other way of catching it.'

More ground for suspicion is, however, to be found in the strange variants of some of the MSS. The lost *Codex Ugoleti* (Schenkl's A) had side by side with *Hic raram* the name of the fabulous wild animal *Mantichoram* (μαντιχόρας or μαντιχώρας) while *Nicticanam* or *Nocticanam* is in the inferior MSS (Schenkl's V). The divergent *nicticanam*, *mantic(h)oram*, *hicraram* may well have come from *adclinem;* which was first written *inclinem* by a common confusion of prepositions (as at line 26 of this poem '*in* sedes' the Gudianus, '*ad* sedes' the rest) and was then further corrupted through such letter changes as are observable at v. 15 'mon*t*ibus' the Gudianus for 'mol*l*ibus,' vi. 29 'ins*t*a nunc'

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torio quidem medicamento, sed quod in furorem uerterit), producing an endless recurrence of aphrodisiac excitement which is compared to the labour of the Danaids and leads to downright madness; and to this the poet traces the atrocities of Caligula's reign. The construction *Phalarim dedisti* is the same as Ter. Ph. 476 'Phormio ... strenuom hominem praebuit,' where C.F.W. Mueller in Dziatzko's edition cites many similar examples, such as Petr. 97 'ut saltem ostenderet fratrem.'

A. E. HOUSMAN.

THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE WARS IN ARMENIA, A.D. 51—63.

III.—THE YEARS A.D. 61—63.

(With a Chronological Summary for all the Years A.D. 51—63).

IN contrast with the second period, this third and concluding period presents the curious difficulty, not of too few points of time marked in the Tacitean narrative, but of too many. And throughout, although different systems are presented, yet the arguments for or against their conclusions have not been set forth save very scantily by any writer. It is, therefore, my concluding task not only to discuss the conclusions, but also to invent the arguments for and against them.

A. Order of Events in Tacitus:—

The end of Book xiv. is concerned with events in Rome of the year A.D. 62.

A. Book xv. opens with a continuation of the account of the Armenian wars and with the words
'*Interea* rex Parthorum Vologeses' etc.—xv. 1. 1.
viz.: Vologeses hesitates whether or no to interfere again in Armenian affairs, when he is roused to action by

A'. Tigranes' invasion and devastation of Adiabene. Monobazus its satrap appeals for aid and Tiridates urges intervention.—1. 2–5.

B. Vologeses' plan of campaign:—

(*a*) Monaeses with the aid of Parthian cavalry and auxiliaries from Adiabene to invade Armenia and expel Tigranes thence.

(*b*) He himself to threaten the Roman provinces.—2.

C. Corbulo, hearing of these preparations, takes the following measures:

(*a*) Two legions (IV. and XII.) under Verulanus and Vettius are despatched to assist Tigranes, but with secret orders not to be in a hurry to fight.

(*b*) He had already written to Nero, requesting that a special commander should be sent out 'qui Armeniam defenderet,' as Syria through Vologeses' menaces was in greater peril, 'acriore in discrimine.'

(*c*) The remaining legions (viz. III. VI. X.) are posted on the Euphrates: provincial militia are armed *en masse*: garrisons are placed at all the fords and the wells are guarded by forts, streams buried by sand, etc.—3.

C' During these preparations Tigranes, anticipating a Parthian attack, threw himself into Tigranocerta.—4. 1. 2.

D. Monaeses and the [Parthians cut off a convoy and appear before the city. An attempt to storm it is repulsed with loss. Blockade of Tigranocerta.—4. 3–6.

E. Corbulo hears of the siege of Tigranocerta and sends to Vologeses threatening an invasion of Mesopotamia unless the siege is raised. This message reaches Vologeses at Nisibis.—5. 1. 2.

F. Vologeses, being in straits for fodder for his horses, owing to a recent locust storm, replies he will send envoys to Rome. Meanwhile he recalls Monaeses from the siege of Tigranocerta and himself retires. —5. 3–5.

G. Tigranes quits Armenia.

[A discussion follows on the real significance of these Corbulo-Vologeses negotiations—in the course of which the question is raised 'Cur enim exercitum Romanum a Tigranocertis deductum? cur

deserta per otium quae bello defenderant? *An melius hibernavisse in extrema Cappadocia*, raptim erectis tuguriis, quam in sede regni modo retenti? Dilata prorsus arma, ut Vologeses cum alio quam cum Corbulone certaret, Corbulo meritae tot per annos gloriae non ultra periculum faceret. Nam, ut rettuli, proprium ducem tuendae Armeniae poposcerat, et adventare Caesennius Paetus audiebatur.'—(6. 2–4).

These questions imply necessarily past events. Hence we deduce the following :—]

G'. The Roman army is withdrawn from Armenia and winters in hastily constructed quarters on the Cappadocian frontier.
Suspension of hostilities.

H. Arrival of Paetus in Cappadocia. He is given Leg. IV. XII. and Leg. V. is summoned from Moesia. Local levies are ordered to assist him. Paetus declares he will annex Armenia as a province.—6. 5. 6.

H'. 'Sub idem tempus' Vologeses' envoys return from Rome after a fruitless mission.
'Bellumque propalam sumptum a Parthis.'—7. 1.

I. Paetus invades Armenia, despite unlucky omens, one of which was the escape of an intended victim from the winter quarters which were being built, but were yet unfinished:
'Hostiaque, *quae muniebantur, hibernaculis adsistens, semifacta opera* fuga perrupit seque vallo extulit.'—7. 2–5.

J. Paetus' expedition. He crosses Taurus 'reciperandis, ut ferebat, Tigranocertis vastandisque regionibus quas Corbulo integras omisisset.' Some forts are taken — capta quaedam castella—Paetus makes long marches —longinqua itinera—But he is forced to retreat '*instante iam hieme*' back to his winter quarters.—8. 1–3.

K. Paetus in winter quarters on the River Arsanias (at Rhandeia [Dio]). Many furloughs granted.—8. 3. 9. 2.

K'. 'Interim' Corbulo strengthens his garrisons on the Euphrates and occupies strongly the hills on the farther bank, despite the presence in the vicinity of the enemy in large numbers.—9. 1. 2. Hence:

L. Vologeses abandons his plan of invading Syria; and marches against Paetus, who is 'imminentium nescius.'—9. 2.

M. Paetus in winter quarters hears of Vologeses' advance and seeks to concentrate his army.—9. 2.–10. 2.

N. Paetus moves out to attack the enemy. A scouting party is cut off by the Parthians, whereupon he falls back again. But Vologeses not pressing the pursuit, Paetus divides his forces, posting 3000 men to guard the passes over Taurus where the enemy's approach was expected, cavalry in 'part of the plain,' and non-combatants with a military guard in the fort Arsamosata.—10. 2–6.

N'. Paetus reluctantly sends to inform Corbulo of the approach of the enemy.—10. 7.

O. Corbulo receives the message and does nothing save issue orders for a force of about 8000 men to get ready for a march.—10. 7. 8.

O'. Parthian advance against Paetus. All Roman isolated detachments, etc., overcome. The main camp holds out.—11. 1. 2.

P. Urgent message from Paetus to Corbulo praying for relief.—11. 3.

Q. Corbulo leaving garrisons on the Euphrates makes forced marches day and night to relieve Paetus, while Vologeses presses the assault of the entrenchments.—12. 13.

Q'. Negotiations of Paetus and Vologeses for surrender of the camp.—14.

R. Roman evacuation of Rhandeia and retreat towards Cappadocia, Corbulo on the day of evacuation being within three days' march.—15–16. 2.

S. Meeting of Corbulo and Paetus on the Euphrates. Corbulo refuses to invade Armenia again.—16. 3–17. 3.

T. Corbulo returns to Syria. Paetus winters in Cappadocia.
'*Exim Paetus per Cappadociam hibernavit.*—17. 3.

U. Agreement between Corbulo and Vologeses (who has quitted Armenia). The former withdraws all his garrisons to the Roman side of the Euphrates: the latter all his garrisons from Armenia.—17. 4. 5.

V. 'Veris principio,' A.D. 63. Arrival of Vologeses' envoys in Rome. The Parthian demands are rejected and Corbulo is appointed to sole command of the war. Cestius is sent to relieve

him of civil government of Syria and Paetus is recalled.—24. 1–25.

W. Corbulo concentrates a large army at Melitene.—26.

X. Corbulo invades Armenia by Lucullus' old route. Friendly reception of envoys from Vologeses and Tiridates, who are sent back with an escort and appeal for an agreement. Meanwhile Corbulo ravages the forts and lands of the hostile Armenian 'Megistanes.'—27.

Y. Meeting of Corbulo and Tiridates at Rhandeia. Tiridates agrees to go to Rome to do homage to Nero for the crown of Armenia.—28–30.

Z. End of the war. Tiridates before his Roman journey visits his brothers, Pacorus in Media, and Vologeses in Ecbatana.—31.

B. The Rival Schemes:—

Alike the beginning and the end of the chronology of these events admit of no dispute.

That xv. 1. 1. connects immediately with xiv. 26 is undoubted. Hence Tigranes' invasion of Media may be placed in 61 A.D., as xiv. 26 belongs, as we have seen, to A.D. 60. And although recounted amid events of A.D. 62, yet to ascribe this to the preceding year is justified by Tacitus' opening word 'Interea.' (A)

Thus A′ = spring A.D. 61.

Again xv. 24. 1. (V.) is the 'beginning of spring,' A.D. 63. Thus

V–Z = events of A.D. 63.

This all being generally admitted there remain for the events A′–U but two campaigning years between which to divide them: viz.:

A.D. 61 ending in the winter of A.D. 61–62.
A.D. 62 „ „ „ „ A.D. 62–63.

Thus there are but two winters for which to make account.

The difficulty of the chronology of this period consists in the fact that we have three separate mentions of a winter in the Tacitean narrative A′–U; viz.:

(1) That of G–G′. 'An melius hibernavisse' &c.
(2) That of I–J. Paetus' 'hibernacula' and the 'instans iam hiems' which enforces his retreat.
(3) That of T. 'Exim Paetus per Cappadociam hibernavit.'

It follows therefore that the second of these winters must be identical either with the first or with the third. And hence we have two rival arrangements of the chronology of these years according as the one or the other of these identifications is accepted.

I. Egli. (P. 291–292). Mommsen (*Hermes* IX. p. 136 N. + E.T. II. p. 58–60).	II. Furneaux (p. 115, N. 10). Following Nipperdey. (Notes *ad locc.*).
Tigranes' Incursion A′ = spring A.D. 61.	G clearly implies that Corbulo's army had already passed the winter before Paetus' arrival. (Cf. *supra*—ad G.)
Locust swarm in F = June–July A.D. 61.	Thus the 'arma dilata' (G′) = winter 61–62.
Hence Parthian envoys absent on mission to Rome from July–Sept. A.D. 61.	And Paetus arrives in spring A.D. 62: invades in summer: retires on approach of that winter.
Their return coincides with Paetus' arrival.	Thus L—T all belong to the end of that same year A.D. 62—these events not implying long duration of time.
Hence Paetus' expedition I. = autumn A.D. 61.	Thus the winter of J = the winter of T.
And Paetus thus has to hasten his raid having but a short time.	
Thus the winter of J = winter of G.	

I.—Summary II.

A.D. 61	A–K′	A–G′
61–62 winter	G. G′. + J. K.	G. G′
62	L–S	H–S
62–63 winter	T. U.	T. U. + J. K.
63	V–Z	V–Z

C. Consideration of the Rival Schemes :—

I. The Egli Scheme:

This scheme which identifies the winter which compelled Paetus' retreat with that of A.D. 61–62 involves more than one difficulty.

(1) It leaves the passage in xv. 6. 2—the question asked 'An melius hibernavisse'—unexplained.

The locust swarm which partly compels Vologeses to enter into negotiations with Corbulo is dated in both schemes in the summer of A.D. 61. These negotiations result, as is necessarily implied in the passage xv. 6. 2–4, in the Roman evacuation of Armenia. (G.) We learn from this passage that this evacuation was a fact, and that hostilities were, as a fact, suspended. The past tense too of 'hibernavisse' cannot be disregarded. 'Why *had* the Roman army been withdrawn from Tigranocerta? Why had that been abandoned in peace which they had defended in war? Was it better to *have* wintered on the Cappadocian frontier...instead of in the capital of a realm just recovered? No! The reason for this suspension of hostilities was &c.'

This passage implies, not a question of future policy, but past facts now undergoing criticism.

It follows that the army evacuated Armenia and spent the winter in Cappadocia, while Vologeses sent his envoys to Rome. Corbulo, from whatever motive, was waiting for Paetus' arrival. Presently Paetus does arrive and makes his preparations; the Parthian envoys return; the war begins again. All this implies time spent, viz.: *after* the winter spent in Cappadocia.

But on this first scheme this winter is entirely disregarded. The negotiations are in the summer of 61: Paetus' arrival in the autumn. What has become of the winter which the Romans, after the negotiations but before Paetus' arrival, *had* spent on the Cappadocian frontier?

(2) The scheme then continues to suppose that Paetus, after a hurried incursion, being forced to return to his winter quarters by the approach of winter, stays in these undisturbed and is only attacked by the Parthians in the following spring, viz.: of 62 A.D. To this there are numerous objections:

(*a*) The events allotted to A.D. 62 are insufficient and have to be spread very thinly over the months from spring to autumn, as Egli arranges them. Or rather, keeping more closely to the Tacitean narrative, we are left with an autumn on our hands barren of events. For the whole affair from the first advance against Paetus to the evacuation of Rhandeia and the meeting of Corbulo and Paetus a day or two later can hardly, at most, carry us from the spring of 62 A.D. further than July. After the meeting Paetus 'forthwith'—exim (T)—wintered in Cappadocia. What has become of the rest of the campaigning year?

This by itself is not a very forcible argument, inasmuch as Paetus is found proposing a renewed invasion of Armenia to Corbulo, as though time for this in that year still remained.

But on the other hand it is notable that the fact of the Roman evacuation of Armenia is not known in Rome itself till the early spring of A.D. 63 upon the arrival of Vologeses' envoys in the city (xv. 25. 1). It is true that a despatch from Paetus had arrived it seems in A.D. 62 (xv. 18. 1. 25. 1) which had concealed the fact of the evacuation. But if this, ex. hyp., had been effected by July 62 A.D. it is well-nigh incredible that no news of it, if not from Corbulo, then from pri-

vate sources, had reached Rome six months later.

Everything, again, in the narrative points to the fact that Paetus is attacked unawares when he thinks that the winter has closed all operations for the year (cf. xv. 9. 2): viz.: just after he has withdrawn to his winter quarters at the beginning of winter. Hence the news reaches Rome only at the beginning of spring. And Paetus' plans for a new invasion of Armenia must have been projected for the following year. This then is the winter of A.D. 62–63, the winter which drove Paetus to retire to those same winter quarters (J. K.). To suppose a Parthian attack in spring gives us far too much time.

(*b*) Another sentence in the Tacitean narrative points to the supposition that the Parthian attack on Paetus occurs at the beginning of a winter, not at the opening of a fresh year's campaign.

Tacitus brings it as a charge against Paetus that he makes his raid into Armenia in a hurry 'necdum satis firmatis hibernaculis' (xv. 8. 1). It is to these unfinished entrenchments that he subsequently retires.

When he hears of the Parthians' approach he sallies out to meet them, declaring 'non fossam neque vallum sibi, sed corpora et arma in hostem data.' (xv. 10. 3).

This proud declaration on Paetus' part is not very probably a mere Tacitean invention. Accepting its genuineness, we remark that there is very great point in it if it be made by way of encouragement and explanation by the general to troops who are looking gloomily and apprehensively upon entrenchments unfinished and fortifications begun and not completed. There is very much less point in the declaration if the general is sallying out of a camp where he has been quietly staying for six months, and whose fortifications, we must necessarily under these circumstances suppose, had been long since completed. 'Adversus urguentes casus' (xv. 10. 2) is a strange phrase to use of a Roman general and army under these conditions. But it is more justified if the army has but just returned to inadequate entrenchments and a large number of furloughs have just been given, while one entire legion has been sent off to winter elsewhere. If the Parthians find Paetus thus dismayed, and thus justifying a spurious confidence despite dismay, the probability again is strong that they descended upon him at winter's beginning, not in spring.

(*c*) Further, during all Paetus' raid, meanwhile—'interea'—*i.e.* before the winter which sends him back, Corbulo has been guarding the Euphrates and, driving the enemy from the further bank, has seized and fortified it. It is because of this his rapid success that Vologeses changes his whole plan of operations and decides to fall on the unsuspecting Paetus.

It is not easy to suppose that an entire winter elapses between Corbulo's demonstration over the river and the Parthian

sudden descent upon Paetus which is the result of this demonstration.

All these considerations lead us to conclude that the Parthian attack on Paetus is made at the end and not at the beginning (as this first scheme supposes) of a year's campaign. If so, this must have been the year A.D. 62, as the news of its results is first surely known in Rome in A.D. 63. The Parthian attack is thus consequent upon his own raid into Armenia. This then must be placed in the autumn of A.D. 62. But to place the raid in the autumn of A.D. 61, and the retaliation in the spring of A.D. 62, as do Egli and Mommsen, runs counter alike to the Tacitean narrative and the probabilities of the case as deduced thence.

II. The Furneaux-Nipperdey Scheme :—

These two objections to the first scheme are serious, and are entirely avoided by the second scheme, which admits the wintering of the Roman army in Cappadocia in A.D. 61–62 : places Paetus' arrival in A.D. 62 : his raid in that year and the Parthian retaliation at the beginning of its winter.

To this second scheme it is also possible to make two objections :

(1) Too many events are crowded into the early winter of A.D. 62. For ex. hyp. after Paetus has retired 'instante iam hieme' there occur in this same winter all the events M–S, viz. the Parthian advance, Paetus' concentration of troops; his march out against the foe, retirement, and new dispositions; the Parthian attack; siege of Rhandeia and its evacuation; and Corbulo's vain march to its relief.

Can, it may be asked, all these events take place after winter's pressure has been, if not already felt, yet immediately anticipated?

On the other hand it may be remarked :

(*a*) That the question of supplies contributed to cause Paetus' withdrawal from his raid, as well as the approach of winter, and he thus may have retired to his winter quarters all the earlier.—xv. 8. 3.

(*b*) The whole events M–S sketched above do not necessarily imply the duration of much time. On the contrary the impression of the entire narrative is one of surprise and speed, with conflicting hopes and fears chasing one another in succession across Paetus' mind. Both the Parthians and Corbulo know there is no time to be wasted. Moreover the Parthians would prosecute a campaign in the beginning of winter with more readiness than the Romans.

This objection then is not very serious.

(2) Paetus makes his raid into Armenia after he has at least begun to erect winter quarters. (I) Surely then, it is argued, this must have been in autumn. Now Paetus is in a great hurry to attack as soon as he arrives. He does not even wait for the arrival of one of his legions it seems, from Moesia (xv. 6. 5. compared with xv. 7. 2.). What then, on this theory, has become of the spring and summer of A.D. 62?

An answer to this objection is not difficult. We may suppose that Corbulo having requested in 61 A.D. the sending of a separate commander to Cappadocia, Paetus does not set out till the next year, and thus arrives only in the early summer of 62 A.D. Moreover, however eagerly he hurries his preparations on, these must none the less have consumed some little time.

But it is better to deny the inference from the erection of winter quarters that the Roman raid began only in autumn. Paetus' raid was not so brief an episode. There are forts taken, and 'long marches' made. Necessarily, too, he requires a fortified base of operations on which in case of need to retire, even though he starts from this in summer, and the more so as this itself is in hostile territory.

Because therefore he begins to fortify the position he chooses for this purpose before his raid, it by

no means follows that winter is not very far off.

In all probability Paetus arrives in the spring of A.D. 62 and sets out on his expedition in the summer, retiring again in late autumn. This objection also is of no great merit.

Note: *Mommsen's View:*

This can hardly be regarded as a separate objection to the second scheme, but must here be shortly noticed.

Mommsen, in *Hermes* ix. p. 136 Note, represents Paetus as actually taking Tigranocerta. This, he declares, is implied in Tacitus' words 'reciperandis Tigranocertis' and confirmed by Dio's words in lxii. 21, seeing that *in the next spring* Vologeses began with the siege of this city. The 'longinqua itinera' and apparent success of the expedition (the 'quasi confecto bello' of xv. 8. 3) coincide with this view.

This note of Mommsen's is misleading and by no means convincing. Dio's words are simply: 'ὁ Οὐολόγαισος τοῖς Τιγρανοκέρτοις προσέμιξε καὶ τὸν Παῖτον ἐπιβοηθήσαντα σφισιν ἀπεώσατο.' There is no single word in Dio's narrative implying that Vologeses attacked the city in spring!

Did Paetus during his raid capture Tigranocerta? This is very improbable. Tacitus ascribes this to him as his professed object and then merely says that he took 'quaedam castella' before his retreat. Had he taken Tigranocerta, Tacitus is bound to have known the fact. Most certainly this large and strong city is not included in the 'quaedam castella' category.

Neither is its capture implied in Dio's words. For the Parthians under Monaeses had failed entirely in A.D. 61 to take the city. Naturally therefore, the town has to be dealt with by Vologeses on the next Parthian incursion thither in A.D. 62. Paetus sets out earlier to 'recover it,' *i.e.* throw anew a Roman garrison, such as had helped Tigranes there, into it. And on hearing of Vologeses' advance, he naturally sets out to help the friendly city, but then retires again. But it is not improbable that Dio has simply confused Paetus' first raid and subsequent march out against Vologeses, so far as Tigranocerta is concerned.

I should then, as against Mommsen, declare that nothing at all in the Tacitus-Dio narrative warrants the conclusion either that:

(*a*) Paetus in his raid captured Tigranocerta.

or (*b*) Vologeses descended upon Armenia and Paetus in the spring.

D. Conclusion:—

Despite therefore the apparent weight of modern authority in favour of the first, the Egli scheme, I think that the second scheme is decisively preferable. This authority's weight is for the most part apparent only. Thus Schiller not only follows Egli with his customary fidelity, but, apparently for once conscious of the possibility of a different view, only fails entirely to understand what Nipperdey's proposed arrangement of these years really is. And Mommsen's hypotheses seem to me, for the reasons already given, not convincing.

Thus, looking at the two schemes side by side, it appears that the first runs counter to the Tacitus narrative, and the probabilities of the case in two great respects, from which blemishes the second is quite free. No really serious objection that I can discover or devise may be urged against the latter. And so far as the fair distribution of events between the two years A.D. 61–62 is concerned this again has the superiority.

Following Nipperdey, therefore, I propose this scheme for the most probable chronology of the years A.D. 61–63:—

A.—G′. A.D. 61	Tigranes' incursion into Adiabene. Monaeses' siege of him in Tigranocerta. Evacuation of Armenia by Romans and Parthians.
G. G′. winter 61–62.	Romans winter in Cappadocia.
H.—S. 62.	Paetus' arrival and raid. His withdrawal.

		Corbulo in Syria. The disaster of Rhandeia. Roman evacuation of Armenia.
T.U. winter 62–63.		Romans winter in Cappadocia and Syria.
V.—Z.	63.	Corbulo's invasion of Armenia. Agreement with Tiridates. End of the war.

General Conclusion.

The result of the entire analysis of the years of the Armenian wars A.D. 51–63 is that I find myself unable to accept throughout the chronological arrangement proposed by any one modern writer or group of writers. Thus:—

(1) For A.D. 51–54 it seems we must reject both Egli and Nipperdey-Furneaux, and devise another arrangement of our own.

(2) For A.D. 54–56 there is no controversy.

(3) For A.D. 57–60 we reject both Mommsen and Nipperdey-Furneaux, and follow, with some slight modifications, Egli.

(4) For A.D. 61–63 we reject Egli-Mommsen, and follow Nipperdey-Furneaux.

The general chronological scheme then in brief will be as follows:—

ARMENIAN WARS: A.D. 51–63.

YEAR.	EVENTS.	TACITUS.
A.D. 51	Invasion of Armenia by Radamistus: Death of Mithradates. Radamistus on the throne.	xii. 44–48.
52	Invasion of Armenia by Vologeses: Flight of Radamistus. (Winter): withdrawal of Vologeses.	xii. 49. 50.
53	Return of Radamistus and harsh rule in Armenia.	xii. 50. 4.
54	Rising against Radamistus and his expulsion: Return of Tiridates. Preparations at Rome (winter).	xii. 50. 51. xiii. 6.
55	Revolt of Vardanes in Parthia. Vologeses evacuates Armenia. Arrival of Corbulo in Cappadocia. Agreement of Corbulo and Vologeses.	xiii. 7–9.
56 } 57 }	Tiridates in undisturbed possession of Armenia. Corbulo's preparations for war, and winter (57–58) under canvas in Armenia.	xiii. 34. 35. 36.
58	First campaign of Corbulo against Tiridates. Corbulo's two plans of action are neither very successful. (Winter): Fruitless negotiations with Tiridates. End of Vardanes' Revolt in Parthia.	xiii. 37. 38.
59	Second campaign of Corbulo and his third plan of action. Capture of Volandum and the forts. Surrender and destruction of Artaxata. March to Tigranocerta. Surrender of Tigranocerta (autumn). Storming of Legerda. (Winter): Corbulo in Tigranocerta.	xiii. 39–41. xiv. 23–25.
60	Tiridates' invasion of Armenia from Media. Corbulo compels his retreat and overruns Armenia again. Arrival of Tigranes and settlement of the country. Corbulo withdraws to Syria. (Winter): Corbulo in Syria: Tigranes in Armenia: Tiridates in Parthia.	xiv. 26.

Year.	Events.	Tacitus
61	Tigranes' invasion of Adiabene. Monaeses' siege of him in Tigranocerta. Negotiations of Corbulo and Vologeses. Evacuation of Armenia by Romans and Parthians. Tigranes quits the country for good. (Winter): Romans in Cappadocia and Syria.	xv. 1–6.
62	Paetus' arrival in Cappadocia and raid into Armenia. Corbulo active on the Euphrates in Syria. Withdrawal of Paetus to Rhandeia. Parthian attack. The Disaster of Rhandeia. Roman evacuation of Armenia. (Winter): Romans in Cappadocia and Syria. Tiridates restored in Armenia. Parthian envoys go to Rome.	xv. 6–17.
63	Corbulo's invasion of Armenia. Conference at Rhandeia and agreement with Tiridates. End of the War.	xv. 24–31.

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REVIEWS.

OSIANDER'S *ROUTE OF HANNIBAL.*

Der Hannibalweg. Von Wilhelm Osiander. Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung. 1900. Pp. 204. Price 8 Mk.

This is a treatise full of industry and abundant in citation of authorities; but it adds nothing of any importance to the controversy, and, it is to be feared, only tends to obscure the issue. There is in the whole book a want of logical argument and a failure to appreciate the real value of whatever evidence is brought forward at each step. In his conclusion Professor Osiander agrees with the view maintained, though not, I believe, in exactly the same form, by several previous writers—that the Mont Cenis was Hannibal's pass. This is a theory for which a good deal is to be said. The arguments against this pass are not nearly so strong as those against the Little St. Bernard. As I remarked in an article which appeared in the *Classical Review* in June 1899, the chief reason for rejecting the Cenis is that, if that route is chosen, all attempt to retain Livy's account must be abandoned. Some previous supporters of that route have said in effect, 'Well and good: Livy is a poor authority: throw him overboard.' Professor Osiander rightly declines to do this; rightly he recognises that, while Polybius is the chief authority, Livy comes next to him, and that it is our duty, if possible, to bring both into line. But I venture to think that no judicious critic will approve of the expedient which he adopts to get over the difficulty.

Livy brings Hannibal to the Druentia; but the Druentia, now called the Durance, flows from Mont Genèvre and nowhere comes near the Cenis route. Well, then, says Professor Osiander, let us suppose that what Livy calls the Druentia was really the Drac and not the Durance. This theory was, I believe, invented by M. Larauza about eighty years ago, and was adopted by Mr. Ellis in 1854. Professor Osiander has resuscitated it; but the arguments by which he seeks to justify it are singularly weak and even misleading—Livy's Druentia must be an affluent of the Isère which borders the territory of the Vocontii, because Silius, who is 'the echo of Livy,' writes: 'Jam rura Vocontia carpit: Turbidus hic truncis saxisque Druentia, &c.' But Silius does not mention the Isère at all in this connexion, and clearly cannot be taken to mean anything more precise than that Hannibal came upon the Vocontii and afterwards reached the Druentia; for Livy, whom Silius 'echoes,' and who may be allowed to speak for himself, says 'per extremam oram Vocontiorum agri tendit in Tricorios, haud usquam impedita via prius quam ad Druentiam flumen pervenit.' It is obvious that, if the